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Pure Superheroes
J. Robert Loftis
The characters Ozymandias and Rorschach from Watchmen seem to 
represent opposite sides in the debate in philosophical ethics between con-
sequentialists, who believe that the ends sometimes justify the means, and 
deontologists, who want us not to think in terms of ends and means at all.
Closer examination, however, reveals that neither character is really true to
their stated philosophies.
Near the climax of Watchmen, Rorschach and Nite Owl confront Ozymandias in
his Antarctic fortress, and Ozymandias starts explaining his insane plan, which will
perhaps save the world, but at the cost of millions of lives. While the smartest man
in the world is offering up the last crucial bit of plot exposition, Rorschach looks
for a weapon. He can find only a fork, but he tries to stab Veidt with it anyway.
Ozymandias blocks the blow and sends Rorschach to the floor, all the while con-
tinuing his monologue. After Rorschach gets up, he tries to make another move 
on Ozymandias but is blocked by Bubastis, the genetically engineered supercat.
Ozymandias doesn’t even need to turn to face Rorschach, let alone miss a beat of
his monologue. Not sure what else to do, Rorschach tries talking: “Veidt, get rid of
the cat.” “No I don’t think so,” Ozymandias replies magnanimously. “After all her
presence saves you the humiliation of another beating.”1 Ozymandias’s speechifying
is a great foil for the taciturn Rorschach. An even starker contrast comes when Veidt
is finally confronted by someone more powerful than he – Dr. Manhattan, the 
comic’s only true superhero. While Rorschach doggedly attacked a foe he knew he
couldn’t beat, Ozymandias immediately suggests compromise. If the others stay silent,
they can enjoy the benefit of Veidt’s new world. Everyone accepts the compromise
– after all, they can’t undo the attack on New York – except Rorschach, even though
it means his certain death.
1 Watchmen, chap. XII, p. 9.
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The contrast between the two characters’ willingness to compromise shows a 
deep divide in their underlying ethical worldviews. Ozymandias appears to be 
what philosophers call a consequentialist: he believes that all actions should be 
judged by their consequences, implying that the ends will sometimes justify the 
means. He is the kind of guy who, when he has to make a decision, carefully lists
the pros and cons and goes with the option that has the most pros on balance. 
At least, that’s the way Ozymandias thinks of himself. Consequentialism is how
Ozymandias rationalizes the bizarre murderous scheme that was revealed in the
Antarctic fight. But consequentialism has a long and noble philosophical tradition,
and the great consequentialists of the past would certainly disavow Ozymandias as
one of their own.
Rorschach, on the other hand, appears to be a deontologist. Deontology says 
that we should not think of morality in terms of ends and means at all; instead,
we should act only in ways that express essential moral rules. Rorschach deonto-
logically rationalizes his actions, such as stabbing away at Veidt using anything 
he can find, even though he knows he can’t succeed. The outcome doesn’t matter;
what matters is doing the right thing. But deontology also has an old and noble
philosophical tradition, and the great deontologists of the past would certainly 
disavow Rorschach as one of their own. Acting to express moral rules does not mean
seeing the world in black and white.
[. . .] Watchmen is an intensely philosophical comic, and concepts like con-
sequentialism and deontology were clearly on Alan Moore’s and Dave Gibbons’ 
minds as they created the book. I hope to show that their attitude toward both 
consequentialism and deontology in Watchmen is profoundly negative. Yet these are
actually only stepping-stones to the real point of Watchmen. The ultimate target of
the comic’s critique is authoritarianism, the idea that anyone should set himself 
or herself up as a guardian of society. Superheroes serve as the images of power
and authority in Watchmen. The ideologies that the heroes pretend to follow are
rationalizations of that power, and the corruption of the superheroes serves as a
critique of both power and its rationalizations.
“‘In the end’? Nothing ends, Adrian, nothing ever ends.”
When Ozymandias is being chased by Dr. Manhattan, he lures Manhattan into an
intrinsic field gizmo (like the one that first created the big blue man) and activates
it, which seems to zap Manhattan into vapor, disintegrating Ozymandias’s beloved
kitty Bubastis in the process. Afterward, Ozymandias says offhandedly, “Him, you
know, I wasn’t really sure that would work.”2 (Actually, it didn’t.) This is a great
Veidt moment in a couple of ways: it shows his willingness to make big sacrifices
for even bigger ends, and to gamble on probabilities. He doesn’t deal with a world
of black and white, of evil and good, as Rorschach does. Everything is gray, but
2 Ibid., p. 14.
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some gray areas are darker than others. To do the right thing, Ozymandias simply
chooses the lightest shade of gray.
In the history of philosophy, this sort of weighing, calculating consequentialism
is most associated with the doctrine of utilitarianism. Although the basic idea behind
utilitarianism has been around forever, the doctrine didn’t really begin to flourish
until the work of the English philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John
Stuart Mill (1806–73). The core idea is simple: “actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness.”3 Utilitarianism is built from consequentialism by adding elements, as
one adds ingredients to a soup. The first new ingredient is hedonism: the good that
one is trying to maximize in the world is happiness. The utilitarian is not worried,
as Rorschach is, about being sure that every criminal is punished. Punishment is
only a good policy if, as a consequence, it makes someone happier by preventing
future crime. The other new ingredient is egalitarianism. Everybody’s happiness is
weighed equally. Thus, if an action will make five people happy and one person
unhappy (all by equal amounts), you should do it, even if the one unhappy person
is your mom – or your favorite genetically engineered cat.
Now, utilitarians are well aware that one cannot in advance know which things
will really maximize happiness for all. So most utilitarians don’t recommend that
we simply try to calculate the best possible outcome each time we make a decision.
Instead, we should rely on the rules and habits that the human race has developed
over time for acting morally. Thus, the version of utilitarianism that is appropriately
called rule utilitarianism says that one should live by the rules that would maximize
happiness for everyone if they were followed consistently. So Veidt might adopt a
rule for himself such as “Never kill,” not because killing never brings more happiness
than unhappiness, but because a person who lives by such a rule would generally
bring more happiness than unhappiness.
The version of utilitarianism called virtue utilitarianism asks you to develop the
personal characteristics that are likely to maximize happiness for all if you really
made them a part of you. Thus, Veidt could spend his time developing a sense of
compassion, because compassionate people generally bring more happiness than
unhappiness to the world.
Utilitarianism has had many critics over the years, and it looks like Moore and
Gibbons are among them. We can see this first of all in the structure of the story.
According to the standard comic book formula, Rorschach is the hero of the story
and Ozymandias is the villain (though, of course, nothing is really that simple in
Watchmen). Rorschach is the first person we see, and the plot is structured around
his investigation of several murders. The audience uncovers the truth behind the
murders as Rorschach does. Ozymandias, on the other hand, is behind the murders,
and when he is found out, he reveals his elaborate plot involving the further death
of millions. Ozymandias also has one of the key flaws that marks comic book 
3 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 7th ed. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1879), chapter 2.
Available (free) at www.gutenberg.org/etext/11224.
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villainy: he is a megalomaniac who wants to take over the world. He may say that the
purpose of his plan is to “usher in an age of illumination so dazzling that humanity
will reject the darkness in its heart.”4 But we know the first thing he thinks about when
he sees his crazy scheme succeed is his own glory. “I did it!” he shouts, fists in the
air. And he immediately begins planning his own grand role in this utopia.
If Ozymandias is the villain, then perhaps utilitarianism is a villain’s ideology. 
It certainly looks as if consequentialism contributed to his corruption by allowing
him to rationalize self-serving ends and blinding him to the profound injustice 
of what he has done. The potential for consequentialism to promote rationaliza-
tion is obvious: once one starts in making sacrifices and trade-offs, it gets easy to
make the sacrifices that will serve one’s own interest. The deeper harm that con-
sequentialism seems to have brought, though, is letting Veidt believe that he can
force people to sacrifice their well-being – indeed, their lives – for the greater good.
Veidt thus fails to consider basic justice or fairness. Is it fair that the citizens of New
York are forced to sacrifice their lives and sanity to end the Cold War, when no 
one else is asked to make such a sacrifice? The means for preventing this kind of
unfairness is typically the doctrine of human rights, which tells us that there are
some things the individual cannot be asked to do against his or her will, even if 
it is for the greater good. One of the most common criticisms of consequentialist
doctrines such as utilitarianism is that they are unable to embrace a doctrine of
universal human rights. And in Watchmen, we certainly see the consequences of
failing to take the rights of New Yorkers seriously.
The Utilitarians Strike Back
At this point, utilitarians will object that they are being unfairly maligned. Veidt is
at best a parody of the ethic they recommend. Far from rationalizing self-serving
interests, utilitarianism is the least selfish doctrine around, because one’s own happi-
ness counts no more than anyone else’s. As Mill wrote forcefully, “I must again repeat,
what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that
the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not
the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.”5 More important, utilitarians
would object that their theory does indeed allow for justice and human rights. 
Mill was a passionate defender of liberty and an early advocate for women’s right
to vote, so it was very important for him to argue that utilitarians can account 
for justice. He did this by using the tools of rule utilitarianism: to make decisions
effectively, individuals and societies must adopt rules for themselves. Experience
shows that individuals and societies that recognize rights are more likely to maximize
happiness than are those that don’t. If Veidt had been a real utilitarian, he would
have recognized this and adopted stricter rules about killing people.
4 Watchmen, chap. XII, p. 17.
5 Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. 2.
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Moore and Gibbons don’t address these nuances – as we shall see in the last section
of this chapter, they are primarily interested in showing ethical theories as ways 
of rationalizing power. They do, however, offer another critique of utilitarianism
that can’t be dealt with by adjusting the fine points of doctrine. It is important 
to note that the critique doesn’t come from the alleged consequentialist Veidt but 
from Dr. Manhattan. In one of the most moving sequences in the book, Veidt asks
Manhattan, with unexpected plaintiveness and insecurity, whether he’s really the
good guy he thinks he is: “Jon, before you leave . . . I did the right thing, didn’t I?
It all worked out in the end.” In the next panel, we see Dr. Manhattan from Veidt’s
point of view. The blue man, standing inside a model of the solar system, arms
down, palms out, smiles and says, “‘In the end’? Nothing ends, Adrian. Nothing
ever ends.”6 Then he leaves Earth for good. Dr. Manhattan’s warning is borne out
four pages later, when we see Seymour, the inept assistant at the New Frontiersman,
reaching toward Rorschach’s journal looking for something to fill up space in the
next issue. If he grabs it, Veidt’s scheme could be ruined, and all that suffering would
be for nothing.
Utilitarianism asks us to look to the future and sum up the consequences of our
actions, but the future is infinite, and you can’t crunch the numbers when every
one of them turns to infinity. Perhaps in five years something will happen that 
undoes the good that Veidt did. Then, ten years after that, something good will
happen that could only have happened given Veidt’s actions. The problem here isn’t
just that we can’t know the future, but that there is too much of it. Even if we had
an infinite mind to encompass the infinite future, what would we see? An infinity
of happiness and an infinity of suffering? We can’t do anything to change a ratio
of infinity to infinity.
And even if we could, what of it? Utilitarianism gets its motivation from the basic
instinct that pain is bad and pleasure is good. Individually, you and I seek pleasure
and avoid pain. Utilitarianism tries to remove the selfishness of this by asking us to
seek pleasure for everyone. In doing so, it tries to make ethics a little more objective:
less about what you want and more about what is good in itself. But if we keep going
with this impulse to objectivity, everything loses its meaning. What does it matter
if there is more pain or more pleasure in the world? We are now in the perspective
of Jon Osterman after his accident: if you take too abstract a perspective, nothing
seems valuable at all. This is a defect in Ozymandias’s worldview. Unlike other 
characters – Rorschach or the Comedian – Ozymandias has never really confronted
the question of the meaning of life or the possibility that life is meaningless. All of
his personal revelations are about the source of suffering in the world, not about
the possibility of morality. He learns that evil is not just a matter of crime, but comes
from geopolitical forces. But he never questions the nature of evil and good itself.
This is the real significance behind Moore and Gibbons’s decision to name this 
character Ozymandias and to use the Shelley poem as the epigraph to chapter XI.
Ozymandias takes a bigger view but never the biggest view.
6 Watchmen, chap. XII, p. 27.
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“Even in the face of Armageddon I shall not 
compromise in this.”
So Ozymandias is a tragic villain, a man whose overwhelming ego and failure to
appreciate the dark nature of life led him to think the end can sometimes justify
the means. That means Rorschach is the hero, right? Well, no. Rorschach is a foil
for Veidt in every respect: the unkempt, taciturn, right-wing outsider against the
slick, eloquent, left-wing celebrity. But just being a mirror to the villain doesn’t make
you the hero.
As we saw earlier, Rorschach often uses deontology to rationalize his actions. We
see this in his constant mantra “in the face of Armageddon I shall not compromise,”
which is an echo of the deontologists’ slogan: “Let justice be done, though heaven
should fall.”7 Deontology goes beyond saying that the ends never justify the means.
It actually says that at least in moral decisions, you shouldn’t think in terms of ends
and means, or consequences, at all. Once you start thinking about means and ends,
you’ve left the realm of morality altogether, because you’re only thinking about 
how to get something you want, either for yourself or someone else. According 
to deontologist Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), morality begins with the good will.
Anything else you might value in life – intelligence, strength, even happiness itself
– can be used for evil. The only thing good, really, is the will to do good, the mental
act that says, “I am going to do the right thing.”
By the same token, if you are doing something solely to achieve some end, 
you are not doing it because it is the right thing to do. This applies not only to
ends we think of as selfish, but even to those we think of as ethical. Think about a
cruel and selfish act, like the Comedian shooting his pregnant Vietnamese girlfriend
at the end of the war. A deontologist would think that part of why this is wrong is
because of the Comedian’s motivation. He’s not trying to do what is right; he’s merely
trying to accomplish an end that is convenient for him, getting rid of a person as
if she were extra baggage. Now think about an unselfish act, such as the redemptive
moment at Bernard’s newsstand when so many passersby intervene to break up the
fight between Joey and her girlfriend Aline. If one of them was jumping in simply
to make himself look good or even to feel good for helping somebody, that would
simply be acting for an end. But if someone helped because it was the right thing
to do, even if that person had no desire to do so, that tells us that his or her act
was moral (in a deontological sense). Interestingly, the people who intervene don’t
talk about pity; they give more deontological explanations, such as, “It’s all that
means anything.”8 They have to act because they’re moral people in a dark world
that can only be lit by the good will. They’re doing the right thing because it’s the
right thing. Kant would smile.
7 Rorschach offers many variations on the “never compromise” mantra. The two that come closest
to the deontologists’ slogan given previously are Watchmen, chap. I, p. 24, and chap. XII, p. 20.
8 Ibid., chap. XI, p. 20.
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But Rorschach is not a hero, and his deontology is not Kant’s. It is a shadow 
of deontology that is used to rationalize fascist thuggery. I wish I could show this
simply by pointing out that Rorschach is a psychotic killer, but in comics, as 
in Hollywood, crazy vigilantes have a certain cachet. To see the real problems with
Rorschach and his use of deontology, we need to look at his hypocrisy, the way his
deontology degenerates into “dichotomous thinking,” and his failure to recognize
the intrinsic value of persons.
Rorschach is not only a flat-out hypocrite, but his hypocrisy reveals his real 
commitments. Rorschach’s supposed commitment to deontology takes a back seat
to the need to project strength in the face of moral decline. Although he delivered
the announcement that he ignored the Keene Act on the dead body of a serial 
rapist, he shows admiration for the Comedian, who attempted to rape the first 
Silk Spectre and confessed to having done many other “bad things to women.”9
After trashing Moloch’s apartment, Rorschach says, “Sorry about the mess, can’t
make an omelet without breaking a few eggs,” a classic bit of consequentialist 
reasoning.10 To heighten the irony, Moore and Gibbons even depict him stealing a
raw egg from Moloch’s fridge, carefully cracking it open, and drinking it. Rorschach
also professes admiration for President Harry Truman, because Truman was will-
ing to sacrifice the lives of millions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to avoid
even bigger losses in the war – basically the same trade-off Ozymandias makes.11
The pattern behind all of these exceptions is telling. In each case, Rorschach slips
into consequentialist reasoning in order to justify a hypermasculine display of 
power and violence. This shows that his real worldview is simply fascist. All of 
the elements of classical fascism are there: obsession with moral decline, idolizing 
the masculine and fearing the feminine, and belief that democratic authority has
failed and must be replaced with something more direct.12
A deeper abuse of deontology comes in Rorschach’s obsessive dichotomous thinking,
the mistake of looking at the world in black and white. Rorschach is thus guilty of
committing a fallacy, a mistaken but very tempting way to reason. Watchmen goes
out of its way to show that where Veidt could at least see shades of gray, Rorschach
is a simple dichotomous thinker. His initial attraction to the fabric he made his
mask from, for instance, came from the fact that black and white never mixed.13
Rorschach seems to think that dichotomous thinking comes with deontology. All
of his statements of deontological principles also say that he sees the world in black
and white: “There is good and there is evil and evil must be punished, in the face
of Armageddon I shall not compromise in this.”14
9 Ibid., chap. II, p. 27; chap. VI, p. 15; and chap. II, p. 23.
10 Ibid., chapter V, p. 6.
11 Ibid., chap. VI, supplemental material, Walter J. Kovacs case file, excerpt of an essay by Walter J.
Kovacs.
12 Umberto Eco, “Ur-Fascism,” in Five Moral Pieces, trans. Alastair McEwen (New York: Harcourt
Trade, 2002), pp. 65–88.
13 Watchmen, chap. VI, p. 10.
14 Ibid., chapter I, p. 24.
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But dichotomous thinking is not at all a part of deontology. Kant taught that 
we should not do things for the sake of ends, but for the sake of doing the right
thing. Still, this does not mean that “the right thing” has to be something simple-
minded or rigid. For Kant, doing the right thing meant obeying what he called the
“categorical imperative,” a rule he phrased a couple of different ways. The first was
to “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, 
a universal law of nature.”15 This sounds weird, but it is really just asking you to
remember a question your mother asked you as a kid: “What if everyone did that?”
For instance, if you pinched some candy from the drugstore, Mom probably said
something like, “Listen, honey, I know it seems like no one is hurt, but what if 
everyone shoplifted candy? The store would go out of business and then no one
would have any candy.” Using a universalization test like this allows for much more
subtle ethical reasoning than Rorschach is capable of. What if everyone was a crazed
vigilante who punished every infraction with death?
The biggest reason Rorschach is not a real deontologist is that he fails to 
show respect for persons. Earlier, we said that Veidt’s worldview fell short of being 
moral because he failed to recognize rights, the moral rules that prevent us from
sacrificing an individual for the greater good. Kant captured this in the second 
formulation of his categorical imperative: “Act in such a way as to treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never
merely as a means.”16 Again, this sounds weird, but what it boils down to is “Don’t
treat people like mere tools to achieve your ends.” When Veidt destroys New York,
he is using the city’s inhabitants as tools for ending the Cold War, thus violating
their basic rights as persons.
Rorschach likewise fails to recognize the rights we typically grant people – for
example, the right to a fair trial. Really, Rorschach drew the wrong lesson from 
his existential moment burning down the home of that child butcher. According
to Kant, we are obligated to always respect the basic rights of persons, because only
a person is capable of exercising a good will, and a good will is the only thing that
is truly good. Rorschach saw some of this as he “looked at the sky through smoke
heavy with human fat.”17 He saw an existentialist version of Kant’s claim that the
only thing good is the good will. In Rorschach’s version, “existence is random, save
what we imagine after staring at it too long” and therefore we are “free to scrawl
our own design on a morally blank world.” What Rorschach didn’t see, but Kant
did, is that this requires us to respect the people who are capable of scrawling a
moral design on the world.
15 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), trans. Jonathan Bennett (2005),
online at www.earlymoderntexts.com, Second Section. This quote appears on p. 421 of print editions
(with standard Academy pagination).
16 Ibid., p. 429.
17 Watchmen, chap. VI, p. 26.
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“Who watches the watchmen?”
So, neither consequentialism nor deontology comes off well in Watchmen. The char-
acters use the ideas as thin rationalizations for corrupt behavior, and, at least in
the case of utilitarianism, the ideas themselves are shown to be flawed. But critiquing
consequentialism and deontology is not the main goal for Moore and Gibbons. 
Their deepest concern is obviously expressed in the aphorism that gives the comic
its name and that appears in fragmentary form throughout the book: “Who
watches the watchmen?” The line finally appears in full form at the very end of 
the book, but in a strange way. Moore and Gibbons give the original source, 
Juvenal’s Satires, but then mention that it is quoted as the epigraph of the Tower
Commission Report (which resulted from investigations of the Iran-Contra scandal
during President Ronald Reagan’s administration). This is a detail people tend to
pass over, if only because the report was written before many current readers of
Watchmen were even born. Perhaps this obscure bit of 1980s history appears only
because Moore and Gibbons were reading the newspapers, rather than Latin poetry,
during the era of Reagan and Thatcher. And the poem in which the line origin-
ally appears is about the difficulty men have keeping their women in line – a bit
of patriarchy that is not a big concern for the comic. The Tower Commission, on
the other hand, is exactly the sort of thing the comic is about.
Watchmen depicts an alternate universe in which the Watergate scandal never 
takes place, a man with superhuman powers allows the United States to win the
Vietnam War, and Nixon is now in his sixth term in office, thanks to a new con-
stitutional amendment. Covert criminal activity of the sort the Tower Commission
exposed seems to have driven this history: Moore and Gibbons strongly imply that
the Comedian assassinated Woodward and Bernstein and further hint that in this
world, Nixon and the Comedian were involved with the Kennedy assassination.
Ultimately, this is all intended as a warning about how a free society can collapse into
authoritarianism, something Moore had previously depicted in V for Vendetta.18 In
that comic, he showed England sliding into fascism after limited nuclear exchanges
in Africa and the European continent, followed by environmental and economic
collapse. In 1988, when DC Comics reprinted a colorized run of the series (including
the ending, which had gone unpublished because the magazine it ran in originally
was canceled), Moore wrote a melancholy introduction lamenting the power of
Thatcher’s Tory Party. Given what has happened, he realizes he was mistaken to
believe that “it would take something as melodramatic as a near-miss nuclear conflict
to nudge England toward Fascism.”19 Basically, Moore was not satisfied with the
picture of a decline of a democracy into authoritarianism in V, and Watchmen, which
was first serialized in 1986, is in part a correction of this.
18 Alan Moore and David Lloyd, 1982–1985, V for Vendetta in Warrior, issues 1–26 (Brighton, UK:
Quality Communications).
19 Alan Moore and David Lloyd, V for Vendetta (New York: Vertigo, 1988), p. 6.
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Ozymandias and Rorschach are a crucial part of this picture, since the superheroes
in Watchmen are images of authority. Moore told the BBC program Comics Britannia
that “What Watchmen became was entirely a meditation about power. We were 
thinking about how to some degree each of these characters represented some sort
of power.”20 Rorschach and Ozymandias are important because we see in them 
that anyone can be corrupted. Leftist or rightist political views are really of little
consequence, because they are merely ways that the powerful rationalize what they
are doing. Consequentialism and deontology are merely further rationalizations of
these ruling ideologies. It is thus not surprising that neither view really gets a fair
shake in Watchmen. Moore and Gibbons aren’t interested in whether the views can
be tinkered with to the point that they are a reasonable guide to behavior, because
that is not how these ideologies function in the real world. Notice also that the most
moral characters in the comic, the two Nite Owls, are basically nonideological. 
They don’t have big moral ideas but rather rely on a basic sense of decency [. . .].
Dreiberg, the second Nite Owl, specifically shies away from making grand decisions
that affect the whole world because one person simply isn’t competent to do so.21
The real lesson behind the entire comic is that no one, no matter what his or her
ideology, should be entrusted with too much power.22
20 BBC Bristol, Comics Britannia (2007), www.bbc.co.uk/bbcfour/comicsbritannia/comics-britannia.
shtml; click on “Alan Moore Interview II.”
21 Watchmen, chap. XII, p. 20.
22 For more on this theme, see chapter 3 in this book, “Super-Vigilantes and the Keene Act,” by Tony
Spanakos.
9781444334351_4_017.qxd  4/27/10  15:08  Page 181
9781444334351_4_017.qxd  4/27/10  15:08  Page 182
